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<u>ASSESSMENT</u>	OF CURFERT SOVIET INTERTIONS IN	THE BERLIN CRISIS:	• •
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Negotiations. The text of the Sepp Schweb (GDR Deputy Foreign Minister) interview printed in the Times of India April 4 (and reported in our semorandum last week) reveals Schwab also stated that "there can be no settlement vithout recognising the sovereign rights of the GDR. This means that at a certain time our consent has to be given to an agreement between the four powers." In a somewhat ambiguous formulation, Schwab furthermore implied the GDR would not insist on veto rights in the Ulbricht-proposed arbitration authority on access but noted that under the proposal the GDR would "be responsible for the conduct of the access routes" as Ulbricht had specified. (He referred to this proposal as only a "first step" and stated that further measures to meet Western objections were "not excluded, nor would the GDR object to this curtailment of its sovereignty.) Schwab also mentioned that the arbitration authority would be composed of members from the four powers and from some neutral states.

ADN reported the interview briefly, giving its title as "Agreement Between East and West Possible" and attributing to the Times of India the conclusion that details of the "latest GDR preposals" were certainly "negotiable." ADN did not, however, report the substance of Schwab's statements or his implication that further GDR concessions might be forthcoming.

Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Smirnev reportedly told SPD journalists he believed a modus vivendi had been reached between Washington and Moscow both on Berlin and on disarmement and that given good faith on both sides, this could lead to a reduction in tensions. Sairnov dismissed references to Ulbricht's access authority proposal with the comment that the Seviets could not prevent the chief of a severeign state from having opinions on a problem of concern to him. The ambassader predicted some "surprising decisions" (unspecified) of "interest to the Germans" would be ferthcoming shortly and also advocated a more pragmatic basis for East-West relations. Similar views have been conveyed recently to a number of SPD officials by Soviet and other bloc sources. In contrast to Sminov, however, Seviet commentator Pelyanov, in an April 8 roundtable discussion on the Moscow radid, claimed Walter Lippman's recent assertion that both sides are satisfied with the status que in Berlin was "quite incorrect."

The GDR Fereign Office has protested FRG effects to stop UN circulation of the GDR March 26 memorandum on disarmament. The UN Secretariat had begun to distribute copies of the GDR communication, arguing inter alia that its action did not constitute indirect recognition of a "state" but merely accept the existence of a "country.

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Military Proporations and Deconstrations. There have been as of this Soviet flights in the Berlin Air than light plans the abrupt consetting of and activity March 3D, and no Soviet Rlight plans have been filed at the Berlin him Safety Center cinco that date.

The GDR provincial press recently published a commentary reasserting East German logal claims to novereignty ever the air corridors, insisting there was no logal basis for the present civilian air traffic to Berlin. However, the article noted the GFR had thus far not prohibited air corridor traffic because "nothing must be left untried to arrive at a peaceful solution by treaty", and that until then, the GDR "reserves to itself the safeguarding of its severeign rights in the air."

The UK Ministry for Aviation announced that beginning May 1, British air lines flying to Berlin would be required to file their scheduled flight plans for corridor runs with the Ministry for advance approvel.

Berlin and Germany. No changes in scooss precedures to or within Berlin were reported during the week. The West Berlin fire department was, however, twice prevented from entering the exclave of Steinstwecken to answer emergency calls.

An autherative East German commentary on the new GDR customs law published April 9 stated that until agreements are reached on the Berlin situation "the mevement of goods between West Berlin on the one hand, and the GDR, the FRG and other states on the other, will preced on the basis of the regulations previously in force." No mention was made of what, if any, effect the new legislation would have on passenger traffic. Article 1 of the law, however, apparently specifies that the "territory of the GDR — no more, no less — is one, independent, sovereign customs area. Customs procedure on the territory of our state is thus regulated exclusively by appropriate GDR state autherities." (It should be noted GDR spokesmen have in the past repeatedly asserted West Berlin is located on the "territory of the GDR", even though it was not part of the GDR state.)

The dysentary epidemic in East Germany continues to spread, with ever 37,600 cases efficially admitted. Travel from Berlin to the previnces has been strictly curtailed and public gatherings, particularly in Berlin, Restock, Potsdam and Frankfurt/Oder have been cancelled.

West German Secial Democrat circles have allegedly been informed recently by Yugoslav efficials that the Yugoslav regime is interested in improving its relationship with the FRG and to that end is willing to dlow its relations with East Berlin to deteriorate. Similar hints to other West German sources were reported last week.

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ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

There is no chings in our established intentions with respect to Berlin negetiations from that presented less week, the additional information on the Sepp Schweb interview tends to confirm the impression that some flexibility in the Seviet negetiating position may be revealed during impending contacts. There are no signs Moscow anticipates an early (and in Western terms, satisfactory) settlement of the Berlin issue, but the USSR evidently believes that, at this stage, a relative normalisation of the atmosphere in and around Berlin serves to promote its objectives in negetiation.

The Schwab interpretation that "recognising the severeign rights of the GDR" involves only GDR "consent...to an agreement between the four powers" is an apparent softening of the usual GDR demands in this respect. (Ulbricht's most limited definition to date of "respect for GDR severeignty" -- a these on which the Soviets have thus for not committed themselves -- required international acceptance of the GDR's present boundaries.) Furtherners, Schwab's indicated acceptance of majority rule in a preposed access authority represents the first public bloc reference to details regarding the operations of the preposed organ. The Soviets have heretofore availed being drawn into any discussion of such "details."

In line with current Soviet avoidance of new tension-raising activities, there is no evidence the GDR intends to utilize its customs legislation in the near future to harass traffic between the FRG and Berlin. However, the April 9 legal commentary indicates the GDR law envisages West Berlin as part of the GDR customs area, ultimately, if not immediately, and not under FRG customs jurisdiction. As a result, the GDR may be primarily concerned with the principle of the applicability of FRG customs regulation in West Berlin -- where Bonn allegedly "has no business" -- and may direct its major effort in the immediate future toward undermining this aspect of the Benn-Berlin relationship. Customs requirements for passenger traffic may be the initial target in this respect.

The GDR commentary on air corridor traffic appears to be primarily a statement for the record, reaffirming the GDR legal case, but indicating no intent to push the issue at least for the present.

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